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The changing life science patent landscape
Arti K Rai & Jacob S Sherkow
What have we learned from 20 tumultuous years of patent law in the life sciences? Is patenting likely to be as 
important for the industry in the future?
Over the past two decades, patent law in the life sciences has been buffeted by numer-
ous controversies. With courts, legislatures and 
patent offices all responding, one could be for-
given for believing that the main constant has 
been change. In the following article, we look 
back at some of the major events in life sci-
ence intellectual property (IP) law and business 
practice over the past 20 years and then suggest 
where IP practice in the life sciences may be 
heading in the coming years.
Controversy and change
In the United States, the standards that govern 
which inventions can be patented have shifted 
dramatically over the past 20 years. In the 
1990s, these standards were quite liberal, and 
patent lawyers routinely filed broad claims on 
what might have been considered unpatent-
able basic research. But as patents proliferated, 
they raised the specter of onerous and costly 
licensing negotiations for downstream innova-
tors1. Such ‘anti-commons’ concerns led the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
ultimately narrow, or even reject, the broad-
est or most speculative claims on early-stage 
research2.
More recently, two additional areas have 
generated controversy: patents on diagnostic 
testing and so-called secondary patents on the 
small-molecule chemical therapies approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
As to the former, critics have claimed that costs 
outweigh benefits: that such patents pose undue 
impediments to patient, physician and scientist 
autonomy as well as patient access3. On the lat-
ter, critics have charged that biopharmaceuti-
cal firms are using patents to develop not new 
chemical compositions but trivial improve-
ments to already approved drugs. On this view, 
‘secondary patents’ serve to perpetually ‘ever-
green’ market exclusivity for certain drugs4. 
Indeed, objections to secondary patents were 
a major point of contention during the recent 
negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement5. Such objections also formed the 
basis for the Indian Supreme Court’s rejection 
of Novartis’s (Basel, Switzerland) patent on a 
derivative of Gleevec (imatinib mesylate), a 
leukemia and gastrointestinal stromal tumor 
therapy6.
Life science patent controversies have also 
caught the attention of the US Supreme Court. 
The vast literature decrying persistent prob-
lems of vagueness and overbreadth in software 
and business method patents7 appears to have 
influenced the Supreme Court’s decision mak-
ing. The Court’s unanimous 2012 decision 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories8 rejected patent claims on adjust-
ing the dosage of a thiopurine drug based on 
measuring the drug’s metabolite levels. In 
rejecting those claims, the Supreme Court 
relied on cases involving software, among other 
technologies, to reach a sweeping holding that 
patent claims encompassing “laws of nature” 
are illegitimate unless they contain an addi-
tional “inventive step.” Similarly, the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous 2013 decision in Association 
of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics9 
famously rejected all patent claims directed 
to isolated genomic DNA. There, the Court 
cited trans-technological concerns about pat-
enting information, holding that patent claims 
encompassing “products of nature” were invalid 
unless “markedly different” from their natural 
counterparts.
These Supreme Court decisions stressed 
policy concerns that broad patents on founda-
tional research may unduly impede  follow-on 
The US Supreme Court has handed down several decisions in recent years that have eroded the 
strength of life science patents.
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innovation. Unfortunately, however, the deci-
sions are widely viewed as having failed to 
explicitly integrate these policy concerns into 
workable legal tests. Because the claims at issue 
in the Mayo case were quite narrow, for exam-
ple, the case likely undermines many existing 
diagnostic patents—both broad and narrow. 
The challenge to diagnostic patents has been 
exacerbated by a recent decision of the US 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Ariosa 
Diagnostics v. Sequenom10. In that decision, the 
court read Mayo as requiring it to invalidate 
patent claims covering a pioneering, nonin-
vasive, prenatal genetic testing technology. 
Several judges have since voiced their concern 
about the impact of Mayo and other decisions 
on life sciences R&D.
Evolving business practices
In other instances, evolving business practices 
have caused decision makers to rethink the 
limits of patents. In its 2013 decision in Federal 
Trade Commission v. Actavis11, for example, the 
US Supreme Court struck down agreements in 
which pioneer biopharmaceutical firms settle 
generic patent challenges by paying substan-
tial sums to the challenger. These agreements, 
the Court concluded, were anticompetitive 
under antitrust law, despite the patent pro-
tections surrounding the challenged drugs. 
Importantly, most of the prohibited settlements 
have involved secondary patents4.
The US Congress has also responded to 
evolving business practices. In recognition 
of the international nature of patent protec-
tion, the procedural changes implemented by 
the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA) have largely harmonized US law on 
patent priority with other jurisdictions12. In 
a partial recognition of the increased costs of 
patent litigation, the AIA also created a robust 
administrative apparatus for challenging pat-
ent validity, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
(PTAB). The most controversial patent validity 
challenges at the PTAB have involved the life 
sciences: challenges to patents on biopharma-
ceuticals brought not by generic manufacturers 
but by hedge funds that short the patent own-
er’s stock13. Here, too, patent law and policy 
have not stood still. Numerous legislative bills 
have been proposed to address these, and other, 
unintended consequences of the ever-shifting 
patent landscape14.
The centrality of nonpatent regulation
For both small molecules and diagnostics, a 
critical but often overlooked innovation pol-
icy lever has been nonpatent regulation. For 
small molecules, nonpatent regulation has 
worked synergistically with patents. A key 
reason patents, including secondary patents, 
have proved to be valuable is the strong link-
age between patent law and FDA approval, a 
feature of the regulatory landscape since the 
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. As a consequence, 
any patent that a developer asserts is relevant 
to its approved product can be used to delay the 
regulatory approval of generics15. The relative 
importance of patents is further enhanced by 
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s allowance for generic 
firms to rely on a developer’s clinical trial data 
if the generics can demonstrate ‘bioequiva-
lence’ to the original drug—studies that cost 
as little as a million dollars16. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, then, empirical research indicates 
that the number of patents per drug for the 
cohort of drugs approved between 2000 and 
2002 was roughly double that for the cohort 
of drugs approved around 1984, the year the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was passed4.
Conversely, a major reason patents have 
historically been less necessary for diagnostics 
than for therapeutics is the absence of manda-
tory FDA premarket approval. Although some 
diagnostic manufacturers of stand-alone kits 
have been required to seek FDA approval, 
laboratory-developed tests (LDTs) have been 
regulated only by the US Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services under the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
(CLIA). CLIA’s regulations assess only the 
test’s analytical validity, not the accuracy with 
which a test measures the presence or absence 
of a particular condition17. With the FDA now 
planning to apply its premarket review system 
for medical devices to at least some LDTs18, the 
capital investment—and number of patents—
required to bring those tests to market is likely 
to increase substantially.
The future
The pattern of constant change to the patent 
landscape may augur well for some life science 
technologies, but less so for others. Changes in 
patenting practice and law outside the United 
States have also affected technology, such as 
human embryonic stem cells (Box 1).
Going forward, the outlook for small-
molecule therapeutics appears challenging. 
Although the USPTO has interpreted Myriad 
narrowly by allowing patent claims to natu-
rally derived molecules so long as they pos-
sess different functions19, the extent to which 
courts will agree with the USPTO is unclear. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Actavis limits the ability of small-molecule 
innovators to use secondary patents and 
reverse-payment settlements to evergreen their 
franchises.
Another potential threat, particularly for 
secondary patents, is the increasing frequency 
with which these patents are being chal-
lenged at the PTAB. Since the procedures were 
adopted in 2012, there have been almost 170 
challenges to small-molecule drug patents 
through these avenues14. All of these changes 
are occurring against a background in which 
the R&D cost associated with bringing new 
drugs to market has increased20. The net con-
sequence may be that small-molecule drugs 
with modest potential consumer markets may 
not be worth commercializing unless they are 
given extra regulatory protection. Many brand 
drug developers have already encountered dif-
ficulties in charging high-premium prices in 
markets outside of the United States (Box 2).
Although prospects for small-molecule 
drugs have diminished, those for biologics 
may have risen. Although R&D costs associ-
ated with bringing biologics to market have 
increased, and even though biologics patents 
may be vulnerable under Myriad, biologics are 
buffered from competition by several layers of 
protection independent of patents. Historically, 
a major buffer has been the absence of any 
generic pathway. And even though a 2010 
law, the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (BPCIA)21, provides a lim-
ited “biosimilar” pathway to rely on pioneer’s 
clinical trial data, the BPCIA still appears quite 
burdensome for follow-on manufacturers. In 
addition, biologics are generally much more 
difficult to both manufacture and characterize 
Box 1  Beyond US borders
Because the US represents the largest market for life science products, rapid 
developments in US patent law are very important. At the same time, the law of other 
jurisdictions has also evolved considerably. In Europe, for example, much of this 
evolution has been driven by concerns about patents that are seen as contrary to public 
morality. The European Biotechnology Directive 98/44 prohibits patents seen as contrary 
to “public order” or morality, and specifically includes in this category patents on 
processes for cloning human beings, modifying the human germ line, and using human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. In 2011, the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU) interpreted this directive to ban patents involving stem cells created through the 
destruction of human embryos25. But a 2014 CJEU decision partially narrowed the scope 
of the 2011 ban so as to exclude stem cells created through parthenogenesis26.
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analytically than small molecules. Developers 
guard manufacturing information very closely 
as a trade secret, and FDA guidance under the 
BPCIA not only requires biosimilar manufac-
turers to attempt to reverse engineer such pro-
cesses—at great cost—but to conduct, at least 
partially, some of their own clinical trials. A 
follow-on approval process that costs hundreds 
of millions of dollars creates an obvious bar-
rier to entry22. But even if FDA were to relax 
its regulatory standards, originator biologics 
manufacturers would still enjoy better market 
exclusivity than their small-molecule counter-
parts: a separate 12-year regulatory exclusivity 
period, 7 years longer than that provided to 
new chemical entities of small-molecule drugs.
Diagnostic testing firms, meanwhile, were 
once able to rely upon both patents and trade 
secrecy for protection. Although patents and 
trade secrecy over the same inventive territory 
arguably challenged the public policy goal of 
promoting disclosure, simultaneous reliance 
on both of these regimes was not uncommon23. 
With patents now in doubt, diagnostic firms 
may rely even more heavily on secrecy.
Secrecy in the area of diagnostics has engen-
dered concern at the FDA. In the context of its 
general determination that it should now regu-
late LDTs, the FDA has emphasized the need 
for regulatory review of the nontransparent, 
“complex” algorithms on which many modern 
LDTs are based18. The FDA is not alone in its 
concern. The agency’s work in this area fol-
lows a prominent Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
report, issued in 2012, recommending the 
FDA ‘develop and finalize a risk-based guid-
ance or regulation on bringing omics-based 
tests to FDA for review’24.
To be sure, FDA review—and regulatory 
exclusivities—can readily co-exist with trade 
secrecy. Indeed, at least for larger firms in the 
LDT space, trade secrecy combined with high 
regulatory barriers that hamper competition 
may represent a very attractive combination. 
But certain commentators have gone further, 
calling for greater transparency in data and 
analyses associated with biopharmaceuti-
cal innovation. They have emphasized the 
innovation-related benefits that could accrue 
from pooling many different types of biologi-
cal data previously held in trade secret siloes 
and making these data more widely avail-
able to researchers23. How tensions between 
open science and trade secrecy will play out 
remains to be seen, and will likely depend 
heavily on trends in public funding of open 
data initiatives.
Conclusions
Over the past 20 years, the patent structure 
surrounding life science innovation has 
changed substantially. If current trends con-
tinue, the future is likely to be one of dimin-
ishing returns to patents. In some cases, 
alternative incentive structures could be 
friendlier to larger firms than smaller firms. 
Regardless, 20 years from now, when Nature 
Biotechnology celebrates 40 years of publica-
tion, others may be writing a similar article 
about trade secrets and regulatory exclusivi-
ties—rather than patents.
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Box 2  Compulsory licenses and drug pricing
In the United States, patent owners typically have no affirmative obligation to license their 
patents. Although the US government may use unlicensed patents if it compensates the 
patent owner27, it has rarely used this power for life science patents. And even when the 
federal government itself funds the patented research, and could therefore—in theory—
“march in” and require patent holders to license their inventions, this has yet to occur in 
practice28. Internationally, however, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement allows its signatories to enact legislation permitting compulsory patent 
licenses in certain circumstances. Thailand, Brazil and India, among others, have issued 
compulsory license orders. Moreover, even the mere threat of compulsory licenses has 
encouraged pharmaceutical developers to lower their prices in response29. How different 
emerging economies will address the dual challenges of providing drug access to their 
populations and building life science innovation sectors remains to be seen.
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